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INTRODUCTION
Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss
Organized labor's obituary appears regularly in the news as well as in schol-
arly commentary, and even union supporters tend to be pessimistic about the
prospects for reconstruction. Over the past three decades, emboldened
employers have redoubled their opposition to collective bargaining, helped
along by deindustrialization, deregulation, and other types of economic
restructuring. As a result, union density has fallen precipitously, especially in
the private sector, in which only 9 percent of the workforce is organized
today-about one-third the level that prevailed in the early 1970s (Hirsch and
Macpherson 2003). Moreover, in the industries and occupations in which
employment is expanding most rapidly, unions are conspicuous mainly by
their absence. Similarly, key population groups like immigrants and women,
whose share of the workforce is growing, remain underrepresented in the
ranks of organized labor-despite evidence that such workers, especially those
concentrated in low-wage jobs, are especially sympathetic to unionization
efforts (Milkman 2000; Bronfenbrenner 1997).
These developments helped spur John Sweeney's dramatic ascension to the
presidency of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) in 1995, on a platform calling on unions to re-
direct resources toward "organizing the unorganized" on an unprecedented
scale. Sweeney's election sparked widespread hopes that he would lead the
Federation down the same road he had previously traveled as president of the
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Service Employees International Union (SEIU): reversing the tide of de-
unionization with imaginative strategies to rebuild union density in previ-
ously organized sectors where serious erosion had occurred, while at the same
time establishing labor's presence in new and growing areas of the economy.
The SEIU's iconic "Justice for Janitors" campaign of the early 1990s already
had vividly demonstrated how new workers (in this case immigrants) in de-
unionized building service jobs could be galvanized into action to restore
union recognition and, against all odds, extract concessions from employers
(Waldinger et al. 1998). And although they used more conventional strategies
and tactics than in the janitors' drive, successful SEIU campaigns in nursing
homes and other health care settings had also shown the potential for
service sector unionization beyond the traditional strongholds of organized
labor.
The SEIU's pioneering organizing initiatives, along with similar develop-
ments in the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) and a few
other highly innovative unions, raised hopes in many quarters that the lethar-
gic "business unionism" that dominated postwar America could be supplanted
by what has come to be called "social movement unionism" -hopes that
gained momentum during Sweeney's initial years as AFL-CIO president.
Drawing heavily on the staff who had helped revitalize the SEIU (some in-
siders quipped that the AFL-CIO was becoming the "AFL-SEIU"), Sweeney
swept aside most of the old guard that had long run the Federation by
installing younger, college-educated cadre, including many seasoned veterans
of progressive social movements. This new generation of union leaders has
been deeply committed to the project oflabor renewal and has been prepared
to use unorthodox tactics toward that end.
The Sweeney era produced some important breakthroughs. Indeed, in the
late 1990s union density finally slowed its downward plunge. Given the rapid
growth of the workforce in the late 1990s and the steady erosion of union
membership through layoffs, retirements, deaths, business relocations and so
forth, just keeping density stable-as the labor movement came close to doing
in the late 1990s-has not been an insignificant accomplishment. Going
beyond this to actually increase density, however, has proven to be an elusive
goal. New organizing has produced membership gains, but these have been
modest, concentrated in a few occupations and industries, and limited geo-
graphically as well. Examples abound of imaginative, successful campaigns
that demonstrate the potential for change-several are analyzed in this
volume-but thus far no one has been able to replicate them on a large
enough scale to significantly impact the overall density problem. Moreover, as
Kate Bronfenbrenner and Robert Hickey show in the first chapter of this
volume, only a few AFL-CIG affiliates have acted on Sweeney's exhortations
to refocus union efforts on organizing. The initial excitement of 1995 has
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given way to a more sober reckoning that is far less optimistic and in some
quarters has led to deep demoralization.
Historically, union growth always has been uneven, with long troughs and
occasional giant waves (Clawson 2003). The surges of growth have never been
predictable-indeed, in the early 1930s, who could have imagined the rise of
the CIG? It remains to be seen whether the embryonic organizing break-
throughs of the past decade will generate a new wave of mass union growth,
or whether the labor movement will remain hopelessly mired in the welter of
employer resistance, internal bureaucratic inertia, worldwide neoliberal hege-
mony, and an increasingly hostile domestic political environment. What are
the prospects for a broader labor movement resurgence? What obstacles stand
~n the way of replicating the organizing gains that have been made over the
past decade on a large enough scale to give unions real influence once again,
of the sort they enjoyed in the 1940s? Those are among the questions posed
by the chapters in this volume.
A STALLED REVOLUTION?
Many commentators have discussed the formidable external obstacles to
union revitalization. For example, it is well documented that employers' anti-
union strategies have become increasingly sophisticated in response to the
new organizing approaches developed by the labor movement over the past
decade, so that the bar unions must overcome is continually being raised
(Bronfenbrenner 2000; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2002). Transnational cor-
porations have developed especialty'potent and sophisticated approaches
to countering union organizing efforts in their u.s. -based facilities, as
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey note in this volume.
The political environment also presents major problems. Even under the
relatively sympathetic Clinton administration, which was the context in which
Sweeney's program was first launched, labor law reform proved impossible.
And since the 2000 election, the political climate at the national level has dete-
riorated dramatically, producing one of the most virulently anti-union
administrations in many decades. The pervasiveness of neoliberal ideology,
which undermines the legitimacy of any collective action project designed to
affect the labor market, is another critical barrier that any union organizing
effort must seek to overcome. Given these myriad external difficulties, at times
it seems miraculous that any organizing successes are possible at all.
Yet the problems are not only external. Significant difficulties within the
labor movement itself also have contributed to the present impasse. Most
importantly, relatively few unions have seriously attempted to implement the
Sweeney program. As Bronfenbrenner and Hickey's chapter in this volume
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demonstrates in compelling detail, only a handful of the AFL-CIO's sixty-five
affiliates are actually engaged in organizing on any significant scale. Equally
important, this analysis shows that even the most active affiliates do not con-
sistently launch the strategically focused, comprehensive campaigns using
rank-and-file-intensive tactics that have proven most effective in the current
political and economic environment.
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey show that only about six Internationals have
vigorously pursued the new organizing agenda that Sweeney promoted
with such fanfare. Besides SEIU and HERE, which stand out as leaders even
within this small group of unions, they identify the Union of Needletrades,
Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE); the Communication Workers of
America (CWA); the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Workers (AFSCME); and the United Auto Workers (UAW) as the key players
in the 1990s, each of which has achieved some major organizing victories. But
few other unions have followed suit: most are hardly attempting to recruit
new members at all. And even among those that are actively organizing, many
fail in their efforts, largely because they continue to use obsolete approaches
that savvy employers can easily neutralize. The result is that for all but a
handful of unions, membership continues to hemorrhage, while their limited
(or nonexistent) organizing activity makes the overall challenge of increasing
density seem insurmountable, generating a vicious circle of demoralization
and decline.
Why is it that so few unions, despite Sweeney's tireless encouragement, have
followed the lead of SEIU and the other unions that have shown the way
forward? One answer is that effective organizing consumes huge resources-
money, staff time, intellectual and legal talent, and so forth. To organize a few
thousand workers can take years, cost millions of dollars, and exhaust the
capacity of already-stretched union staffers. Can the modest benefits of any
single campaign really justify such enormous costs? Will the incremental
membership gains that result have any significant impact on the density
problem, for an individual union, industry, or sector-or for the labor move-
ment as a whole? Not only outside commentators but also many progressive
unionists ponder these questions regularly as they seek to maximize the
impact of scarce resources, and to balance the work of serving their existing
membership against the challenge of recruiting new workers into the fold.
The cost-benefit dilemma is a serious one for union leaders. Yet, union
organizing efforts can be highly effective when key clusters of tactics are used
in combination, as Bronfenbrenner and Hickey argue persuasively in this
volume-offering systematic empirical evidence in support of the union
slogan, "Si, se puede!" (Yes, it can be done!) If all sixty-five affiliates of the
AFL-CIO were as active and strategically sophisticated in organizing the un-
organized as the SEIU, the resulting quantitative gains in union membership
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might even translate into a qualitative leap forward. Moreover, if the alterna-
tive to expending major resources on new organizing is the slow (or perhaps
not so slow) death of organized labor as a major social force, then investing
all available resources in the project is simply imperative.
Yet, the daily reality on the ground is rather different-at least from the
viewpoint of the individual labor leaders who are in a position to deploy or
withhold resources for organizing. Most of these leaders are fully aware of the
density crisis and of the fact that the very survival of organized labor is poten-
tially at stake. But the decentralized structure of the American labor move-
ment means that the lived experience of this crisis is highly fragmented. In
some local unions-and it is at the local level that most organizing efforts are
initiated-membership is stable, and the day-to-day work involves contract
administration and other routine tasks. In such contexts, union officials may
well be complacent about the larger crisis of the labor movement. Moreover,
especially if they are elected (as opposed to appointed) leaders, they may be
reluctant to bear the considerable risks involved in new organizing, even if
adequate resources are available. From their perspective, while a major organ-
izing success might have a large political payoff, a failure could be a career-
breaker. In fact, even a success can be problematic if it overturns the political
status quo of the local. In the absence of any attractive employment alterna-
tives, most such officials, particularly the middle-aged (or older) function-
aries who are at the helm of so many local unions, tend to be quite cautious
in this regard. For them, avoiding the risks inherent in undertaking major
organizing efforts is entirely rational, and this political calculus must figure
prominently in any effort to explain why organizing activity is so limited.
Even when local leaders are prepared to take a chance on organizing,
however, success is unlikely without extensive support from the International
union (Voss and Sherman 2000). At the level of the International, union offi-
cials tend to be appointed rather than elected-and even when elected are
unlikely to be deposed given the one-party-like systems that govern most
Internationals. Even though in most cases they run little or no political risk
by investing in organizing, International union leaders are nonetheless habit-
ually cautious and wary. They tend to be even older than their local counter-
parts, and thus perhaps even less concerned about the long-term outlook for
the movement as a whole. And for most of them, to impose change on reluc-
tant local leaders is hardly the course ofleast resistance. Thus at the Interna-
tional level too, many union leaders are reluctant to invest the resources
required for serious organizing initiatives. While they may echo the rhetoric
of reform, few have taken the necessary practical steps toward implementing
Sweeney's call to focus on rebuilding their base.
The AFL-CIO itself, while occasionally providing resources for its affiliates'
individual organizing campaigns (in the shape of extra staff or funding), does
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virtually no organizing on its own. The fact that the Federation is plagued by
aplethora of internal divisions and inter-union rivalries doesnot help matters
(Lerner 2003, 26). Indeed, over the years some unions have disaffiliated
entirely from the AFL-CIG, most notably the Carpenters. The fragmented and
decentralized structure of the Federation, and the mistrust many individual
locals and Internationals harbor toward one another, also makes it difficult to
build multi-union organizing efforts, which in the abstract would appear to
offer a promising strategy for large-scale sectoral organizing. In the excep-
tional cases where such efforts have been launched, they have proven difficult
to sustain because of the internal tensions within labor's ranks (for an
example, see Delgado 2000).
"Raiding" is a related problem, which involves one union persuading
already-organized workers who are members of another union to switch their
affiliation. This boosts the membership of the raiding union (and may even
be presented as an "organizing" victory), though it has no impact whatsoever
on the overall density problem. And of course raiding involves unions ex-
pending valuable resourceS fighting one another rather than focusing on the
challenges facing the movement as a whole. Certainly this does not contribute
in any meaningful way to the formidable task of redirecting resources into
organizing the unorganized on a large scale.
Yet another obstacle to transforming the labor movement is the gender and
ethnic mismatch between union leadership and that of the vast unorganized
sector of the workforce. Despite the Sweeney administration's efforts to
increase diversity at the highest levels of labor's officialdom, the majority of
union officials are still older, native-born white males, who often have diffi-
culty appealing to the nation's increasingly female, foreign-born and relatively
youthful workforce. There are more women and minorities at all levels of
labor leadership today than in the past, but in most cases their representation
remains limited to that of tokens. Insensitivity or simple obliviousness on the
part of labor leaders to the issues that can move women, immigrants, and
young workers is the inevitable result, despite several initiatives Sweeney has
launched to reach out to these groups.
Not only must the composition of union leadership change in order for
organizing the unorganized to assume center stage, but the organizational
structure and culture of unions must be overhauled as well. This is especially
true at the local level, where the longstanding organizational focus has been
contract enforcement and member services. The vast majority of local union
staff positions remain dedicated to these functions, as do the overwhelming
majority of funds and other resources (Milkman and Rooks 2003). And local
union culture has reflected these priorities as well, so that many members have
learned to view their unions as quasi-insurance companies or lawyers-calling
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on union representatives when problems arise at work, but otherwise not par-
ticipating much in union affairs.
Ultimately, in order to recruit new members on a scale that would be
required to significantly rebuild union power, unions must fundamentally
alter their internal organizational practices to direct staff resources to organ-
izing (Voss and Sherman 2000; Fletcher and Hurd 2001). This means shifting
priorities away from servicing current members and toward unionizing new
ones-creating more organizer positions on the staff; developing programs to
teach current members how to handle the tasks involved in resolving shop-
floor grievances, so that existing staff are freed up to work on external organ-
izing; and building programs that train members to participate fully in the
work of external organizing. Such a reorientation entails redefining the very
meaning of union membership from a relatively passive stance toward one of
continuous active engagement. For unions, as for any other type of organiza-
tion, such a fundamental shift in orientation faces many obstacles-perhaps
most importantly, confronting the formidable forces of bureaucratic inertia.
In the unions that have been successfully transformed, the process typically
has been orchestrated from the top, contrary to the rather romantic view that
only the rank and file can be the fount of democratic change (Voss and
Sherman 2000). The prime example here is SEIU, and Stephen Lerner, one of
the architects of the janitorial campaigns that have been so central to spark-
ing the wave of union revitalization in the 1990s, unapologetically asserts
that a key element of J for 1's success was the institutional decision not to tol-
erate local leaders who did not want to organize. Lerner argues that in order
for the labor movement to rebuild, it needs union leaders who are fully com-
mitted to putting organizing first, who are willing to focus all the institutional
resources they control on that task, and who are willing to create moral and
physical crises in the workplace in order to overcome employer opposition.
Mass organizing, he contends, justifies a ruthless approach to purging any
union staffers who refuse to go along with the program. This can involve
forcing union mergers to rationalize collective bargaining regimes and
ongoing organizing efforts, using trusteeships to bring resistant locals into
line, as well as other seemingly undemocratic tactics (Lerner 2001). While this
approach has engendered a stream of criticism from some quarters, no one
can deny that the SEIU has by far the best record of recruiting new members
and of advancing the difficult but crucial process of organizational change.
Yetlasting transformation does require genuine rank-and-file participation,
so that members come to sense their ownership of the organization, a
dilemma that Teresa Sharpe's chapter in this volume excavates in detail. This
is the key strength of the HERE approach to organizing, which involves an
intensive phase of training rank-and-file union members in a wide variety of
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leadership skills. These include: how to articulate the value and meaning of
union building; how to persuade unorganized workers to commit themselves
to that task, even at the risk of their (already precarious) livelihoods; and how
to build confidence that union members themselves can successfully resolve
problems in the workplace without relying on business agents or other
experts. The process of worker empowerment is extremely labor-intensive,
and HERE may be the only union to have fully developed the commitment
and organizational capacity to implement such an approach across a range of
different campaigns. Sharpe's chapter shows in rich detail just how complex
this process is and exposes the tension between the inevitable reliance on the
leadership and expertise of professional organizers, on the one side, and the
urgency of transferring real decision-making power to the rank and file, on
the other.
Yet another obstacle to new organizing is the unpleasant reality that in
many contexts rank-and-file workers are not inherently pro-union, as the
shapters by Steven Lopez and Robert Penney in this volume vividly demon-
strate. Lopez's study of nursing home organizing in the "rust belt" exposes the
very negative view of unions held by many workers who witnessed the devo-
lution of industrial unions firsthand in the 1980s. That historical legacy is a
major obstacle for the new unionism. Lopez shows that it can be surmounted,
but that accomplishing this requires enormously nuanced strategic thinking
and experienced leadership of just the sort that SEIU has developed. Penney,
who also studied SEIU campaigns in the Midwest (although in hospitals
rather than nursing homes), goes even further in emphasizing the conser-
vatism of rank-and-file workers. He shows that in some circumstances hos-
pital workers actively opposed unionism, which they viewed as a likely source
of conflict and hostility in the workplace, and not necessarily as leading to any
material gains. These workers, while skeptical about union organizers' claims,
responded positively to employer promises of advancement through cooper-
ation with management. Penney argues that the "No on Union" committees
that many commentators dismiss as transparent vehicles of management
manipulation are genuinely appealing to many workers, who actively embrace
them and independently take on leadership roles in opposing union cam-
paigns. If some ambiguity remains as to the relative importance of workers'
own contributions to anti-union committees as compared to management's
direct or sub rosa support for them, there is no doubt that they are a force to
be reckoned with in many organizing campaigns.
This makes the role of professional organizers all the more central to
rebuilding the labor movement, whether unions adopt an approach like that
of the SEIU or that of HERE. Recruiting and training energetic and savvy
organizers is critical-as is retaining them. As Daisy Rooks' chapter in this
volume illustrates, the occupational culture of union organizing is extremely
'--.
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intense, and the high level of dedication it demands is often difficult to sustain,
especially in the absence of day-to-day emotional support and a serious insti-
tutional commitment to organizers as the key agents of labor movement
survival and growth.
Through initiatives like the AFL-CIO's Organizing Institute (01) and pro-
grams like Union Summer, many talented young activists have been drawn
into the labor movement in recent years. Indeed, for this generation labor
organizing appears to be one of the few viable arenas in which to fight for
social justice. But, as Rooks shows in rich detail, holding onto these young
activists has proven difficult in the face of the grueling "cowboy culture" of
24/7 campaigning-easily justified by intransigent employer anti-unionism-
and the uneven commitment to change within the labor movement itself.
Thus unions may thoughtlessly squander precious human resources in the
desperate battle for immediate survival, while the process of long-term lead-
ership development recedes onto the distant horizon. This is among the many
reasons that the recent organizing successes of the new labor movement have
yet to be replicated on any significant scale.
BUILDING THE NEW LABOR MOVEMENT
If we put the question of scale to one side, there are many hopeful examples
on the local level that show the potential for labor movement expansion.
HERE and SEIU provide the leading models, as we have already noted. Those
two unions and others have shown how effective creative and well-crafted
organizing strategies can be. And these unions have also built impressive
alliances in recent years, bridging divisions within the labor movement, as well
as in the wider social and political community. In addition to coalitions with
student activists, labor has built ties to immigrant rights groups, environ-
mental advocates, the anti-globalization movement, and even the peace move-
ment-breaking from the historic social isolation that for many decades had
limited labor's vision and power (Clawson 2003).
When labor pursues social movement unionism, activists in these allied
movements respond positively, attracted to its far-reaching vision of social
justice and impressed by its institutional resource base and longstanding polit-
ical influence. This dynamic recalls the historic influence of the United Farm
Workers (UFW) on a whole generation of social movement activists. Many of
those who initially got involved were attracted to the UFW because they saw
it as part of a larger movement for social justice rather than simply as a labor
union. They soon discovered, however, that unions themselves could be a
vehicle of social change, as the chapter in this volume by Marshall Ganz, Kim
Voss, Teresa Sharpe, Carl Somers, and George Strauss explains. More recently,
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immigrant union organizing campaigns have drawn in human rights and
immigrant rights activists who have come to appreciate labor's potential con-
tribution to a larger progressive agenda.
Many of the architects of new labor, then, have experience in other social
movements, and this is indeed the source of many of the innovations that are
guiding labor's transformation (Voss and Sherman 2000). Activists from the
1960s and 1970s generation, who cut their teeth in the New Left, the anti-
Vietnam War movement, civil rights, and the women's movement, are now
top leaders in many of the most innovative unions, as well as in the AFL-CIO.
They have, in turn, worked to recruit a new generation of activists and to per-
suade them that labor is a viable arena for social justice efforts. The tactical
repertoire of the earlier generation is palpable in AFL-CIO initiatives like
Union Summer and the 01. As Leslie Bunnage and Judith Stepan-Norris
recount in their chapter in this volume, Union Summer was explicitly
designed to replicate the success of Freedom Summer-and it was most suc-
cessful when student recruits were partnered with especially innovative and
forward-looking union campaigns. The 01, similarly, seeks to teach young
activists the techniques of nonviolent civil disobedience and other tactics
honed in the social movements of earlier eras. The union-led 2003 Immigrant
Workers' Freedom Ride is another deliberate echo of the 1960s.
Electoral politics, where unions retain far more influence than the density
figures would suggest, has become another important arena for the new labor
movement. California, and especially Los Angeles, has emerged as a site where
labor has created a virtuous circle,whereby organizing successtranslates into
political clout and vice versa (Meyerson 2001). On the municipal level too, as
Preston Rudy's chapter in this volume shows, the SEIU has experimented with
coalition-building, albeit with various degrees of success, increasingly recog-
nizing the importance of the political arena in its efforts to recruit unorgan-
ized workers. In San Jose, Rudy shows, the janitors' campaign succeeded in
part because it was able to tap into the political visibility and public legiti-
macy of a preexisting anti-growth coalition; however, the failure of a parallel
effort in Sacramento suggests that alternative political strategies are necessary
in certain contexts. In Sacramento, where a pro-growth coalition held power,
SEIU activists experienced many setbacks before they found a way to define
janitors' poverty as an issue of public concern, rather than as simply a private
matter between workers and their employers. That SEIU activists were even-
tually successful in this effort suggests that labor is becoming much more
savvy and effective in the political arena at both the municipal and state levels.
The same kind of careful strategic thinking is imperative for success
in individual organizing campaigns at the workplace level. Not only, as
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey's chapter shows, can comprehensive campaigns
that draw on the full range of tactics in labor's arsenal be successful, even when
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faced with determined employer resistance, but in addition, and contrary to
popular belief, there is no economic downside here. For as DiNardo and Lee's
(this volume) analysis of more than 27,000 union certification elections
between 1983 and 2000 reveals, successfully unionized establishments are no
less likely to survive in the marketplace than their non-union counterparts.
All this offers a basis for optimism: if the labor movement could effectively
combine the successful strategies that Bronfenbrenner and Hickey highlight
at the workplace level with those Rudy and others document in the political
arena, and replicate both on a large scale, labor could emerge as a formidable
social force once again.
OUTUNEOFTHEVOLUME
We begin with Bronfenbrenner and Hickey's broad overview of the current
state of union organizing in the United States. This analysis scrutinizes the
organizing records ofInternational unions in the late 1990s in extensive detail,
emphasizing that the "New Labor" phenomenon is in actuality limited to a
few key unions. The chapter provides both a sobering assessment of the
accomplishments of this segment of the labor movement and a blueprint of
the tactical repertoire that the innovative unions have successfully deployed
to overcome employer opposition to new organizing.
The next three chapters look at the organizing process from a different
vantage point, using qualitative data to evaluate campaigns launched by HERE
and SEIU over the past several years. Sharpe's ethnographic study of a hotel
organizing campaign exposes the complex process by which professional
organizers create space for rank-and-file workers to become leaders, while still
using their own expertise to guide the campaign strategy. She offers a very
nuanced view of union democracy, going well beyond the standard focus on
leadership turnover and the structure of union governance. This case study
reveals the tension between building a participatory model of unionism and
capitalizing on the accumulated knowledge of experienced organizers. That
the hotel campaign deliberately avoided the traditional NLRB electoral road
to unionization makes Sharpe's research of even greater interest, since there
are so few studies of alternative organizing approaches.
Even less frequently examined is the reality of rank-and-file anti-unionism
that is the focus of the next two chapters. Penney's study of workers who
actively oppose union organizing campaigns is a pioneering analysis of a topic
that few labor scholars are prepared to confront. It shows that unions are
anathema to many workers-to the point that some will actively invest time
and effort in assiduous resistance to union appeals. Penney takes the anti-
union stance of these workers seriously, arguing that members of "VoteNo"
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committees like the ones he interviewed are genuinely committed to the anti-
union cause, even if they are being manipulated by management. Unpleasant
as it may be, organizers need to understand this increasingly common phe-
nomenon if they are to function effectively.
In other cases, workers may not actively organize against unions but they
may nevertheless vote "no" in union elections. Steven Lopez documents an
example of this in a context in which employer opposition was relatively mild.
He compares two successive efforts to organize the same group of nursing
home workers, one that failed and one that succeeded, confronting the reasons
why even highly aggrieved workers often view unions as "do-nothing" organ-
izations, as corrupt, or even as the cause of economic decline. Lopez shows
that using the tactics Bronfenbrenner and Hickey recommend can indeed be
effective, but argues that organizers must go even further by directly con-
fronting workers' negative lived experience of unionism and by demonstrat-
ing with their actions that the new social movement unionism is distinctly
different.
Recent literature on organizing tends to focus on the content of the cam-
paigns themselves, paying less attention to the broader context in which they
are embedded. However, Rudy's chapter higWights the role of the political
environment and of the external forces that shape union campaigns. His
comparative analysis of two SEIU janitorial organizing drives in northern
California reveals the importance of framing labor struggles in broad terms
that reach beyond the parochial, narrow definition oflabor as a "special inter-
est." Rudy shows that achieving this is far more difficult in some settings than
others, depending on both the history of the local labor movement and on
the skill of anti-union forces in defining labor as a narrow, special interest
group. In one of his case studies, for example, Democratic politicians who
might otherwise have supported labor were reliant on the targeted employers
for financial and electoral support. Rudy also demonstrates the ways in which
successful organizing campaigns can reshape the political context itself.
Taken together, these case studies expose many of the dilemmas con-
fronting the leaders of the new labor movement. Not only must they face the
challenges of building a more participatory democratic union culture, which
traditionalists within the union officialdom themselves often resist, but they
also are up against deeply entrenched anti-union sentiment from employers
and the political establishment, as well as among workers themselves. How do
unions recruit leaders who are prepared to confront these formidable obsta-
cles? That is the subject of the next three chapters.
In the first, Ganz and his collaborators look at the generation of activists
who entered organized labor in the 1970s and early 1980s, many of them vet-
erans of the 1960s wave of protest movements. The data are drawn from a
unique longitudinal study of California labor leaders who were first inter-
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viewed in 1984 and re-interviewed 18 years later. Today, several of them hold
prominent positions in both state and national unions. This study not only
highlights the reasons that this generation of leaders chose the labor move-
ment as the arena for their work-well before the reforms of the 1990s-but
also reveals the role some of them played in that transformation process. In
addition, it examines in detail the ways in which individuals adapt to and help
perpetuate established organizational cultures, as well as the reasons why some
deliberately work to change those cultures.
The two chapters that follow shift the focus to a younger generation of
labor organizers. Unlike the older leaders, the newer cohort was actively
recruited into the labor movement through special outreach programs
designed to attract student activists-part of New Labor's effort to break out
of its social isolation and to make labor a social movement once again. Rooks'
study of organizer retention focuses on the Organizing Institute, perhaps the
most high-profile of these efforts. She shows that many factors conspire to
erode the enthusiasm and commitment to social justice with which young
recruits begin their labor work, highlighting the gap between the political
ideals that motivate them and the reality on the ground in many of the local
unions in which they are placed. Rooks documents the very high turnover
typical of these young organizers and shows that one of the few effective
means of reducing it is the presence of supportive peers-something that has
received surprisingly limited attention, even from the leaders most dedicated
to labor's new agenda.
Bunnage and Stepan-Norris examine another Sweeney-era program ori-
ented to recruiting young activists: Union Summer. They trace the origins of
the program and its implementation in 1996 and then turn to explore the
experiences of the first group of student recruits. Whereas the Organizing
Institute was designed to attract young people into labor movement careers,
Union Summer had a somewhat different purpose: to engage students on a
short-term basis in labor's struggles and to build bridges to other progressive
movements on college campuses and in the wider community. Bunnage and
Stepan-Norris attempt to sort out the circumstances under which students
were successfully integrated into unions' organizing campaigns, as well as the
factors that led some students to make a longer-term commitment to labor.
Their chapter also includes an epilogue on how Union Summer has changed
since it was first launched in 1996.
The volume concludes with a chapter that examines the effects of union
organizing on the economic viability of the firms involved. Contrary to the
view often repeated by employers (and at times echoed by workers themselves,
as Lopez's chapter notes), Lee and DiNardo's rigorous quantitative analysis
finds that union victory in an NLRB representation election has no effect on
establishment survival. This important finding is powerful ammunition for
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the ongoing political debates about labor's future in the context of intensify-
ing economic competition. Of course, even if unions did have negative eco-
nomic effects, one might argue that their other social benefits are worth the
cost, but this chapter suggests that this presumed tradeoff is nonexistent.
TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR NEW LABOR
During the 1930s, which was the last time there was a giant wave of union
growth in the United States, intellectuals and labor activists actively collabo-
rated to address the dilemmas faced by U.S. workers, jointly challenging cor-
porate domination, social injustice, and economic insecurity (Lichtenstein
2002). Many of the contributions in this volume suggest the potential fruit-
fulness of reviving this tradition of labor-academic cooperation, while once
again labor struggles to renew its power. Thus research like that of DiNardo
and Lee can be used by labor activists to counter the claim that unions serve
only to undermine business survival. Studies like Bronfenbrenner and
Hickey's can be used by union reformers to influence labor leaders who resist
change. Findings like those of Rooks; Bunnage and Stepan-Norris; and Ganz
and his co-authors can be a resource for both local unions and the AFL-CIO
to design more effective programs to attract and integrate activists from other
social movements into organized labor. And organizers can use research like
Lopez's and Penney's to design campaigns that better address the concerns of
anti-union workers.
However, the academic-labor relationship is a two-way street: active
engagement with the new labor movemeI\t can deeply enrich scholarly
research too, as the studies collected in this volume illustrate. It is no accident
that many of our contributors were themselves former organizers: Ganz spent
many years as the UFW's Organizing Director; both Rooks and Sharpe are
former 01 staffers; Bunnage was on the staff of Union Summer; Penney is a
former SEIU organizer; and Rudy, Bronfenbrenner and Hickey all have labor
organizing experience as well. In addition, Sharpe and Lopez volunteered or
interned in the campaigns they studied. More generally, the recent revitaliza-
tion of labor has sparked a new wave of research on organizing, after many
years of neglect of the topic. This new scholarship is not only being under-
taken by former organizers but also draws in researchers from a variety of dis-
ciplinary backgrounds and theoretical persuasions. A new generation of labor
scholars has emerged, whose growing body of work is not only important in
its own right, but may eventuallycontributevaluablenew insights to our
understanding of organizational change and to the advancement of demo-
cratic practices, not only in institutional settings but in the wider civil society
as well.
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Important as the contributions collected here are, they also neglect some
important questions. Perhaps the most urgent of these is to explore more fully
what happens after organizing drives succeed. How often do unions get con-
tracts after winning recognition, and under what conditions? What are the
costs of employers' anti-union campaigns and the polarization they cause
within the workforce? DiNardo and Lee pose some of these questions, but
their research thus far does not offer any definitive conclusions.
Another aspect of the aftermath of organizing campaigns also deserves
more attention, namely, how to sustain participatory social movement prac-
tices after union recognition has been achieved? Sharpe's chapter suggests the
importance of such practices, but the question of how to maintain them over
the long haul is a pressing one that has barely been studied (one exception is
Markowitz 2000). A related issue concerns the incorporation of immigrants
and other underrepresented groups into union leadership positions. Even the
legendary Justice for Janitors campaigns often have precipitated leadership
struggles between newly organized immigrant workers and old-guard (native-
born) union leaders. More broadly, unions have been much better at in-
corporating immigrants, women, and racial and ethnic minorities into
membership than into leadership positions. This problem is salient even at
the local union level, and far worse in the upper reaches of labor's
officialdom.
Finally, successful organizing campaigns may have implications for broader
efforts to democratize society. We know from the work of Robert Putnam
(2000) and Theda Skopol (2003) that civic participation has declined sharply
in the United States, and that there are precious few "schools for democracy"
in America today. Can the empowerment generated by social movement
unionism spill over into other aspects of social life? Will workers who learn
to resolve their own problems at work also be more likely to intervene pro-
ductively in the schools their children attend and in the communities where
their families live? If so, social movement unionism can help rebuild not only
organized labor itself but also democratic practices more broadly. In that case,
not only those of us concerned about labor's revitalization for its own sake,
but also anyone interested in fostering progressive social and political change,
can profit from the insights of the new wave of research on organizing that is
represented in the following pages.
...
The chapters in this book were first presented at a conference organized by
the editors under the auspices of the University of California's Institute for
Labor and Employment, held at UCLA on May 17,2001. We thank the ILE
for its support as well as the scholars who served as discussants for the
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gathering: Sanford Jacoby, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Margaret Weir. All the
papers were improved as a result of their insightful critiques as well as the
group discussion at the conference. We also are indebted to Richard Freeman
and Richard Flacks, both of whom reviewed the manuscript for Cornell
University Press, and whose comments and suggestions much improved the
volume. Finally we thank Fran Benson, editor extraordinaire, whose support
for this project went far beyond the call of duty.
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CHANGING TO ORGANIZE
A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF UNION STRATEGIES
Kate Bronfenbrenner and Robert Hickey
In 1995 "changing to organize" became the mantra of a newly invigorated
labor movement. There was talk of building a national organizing fund,
recruiting thousands of new young organizers, and organizing millions of
workers in new occupations and industries. In the years that followed, the
AFL-CIO and its affiliates engaged in an aggressive effort to increase their
organizing capacity and success. Staff and financial resources were shifted into
organizing; leaders, members, and central labor bodies were mobilized to
support organizing campaigns; and hundreds of new organizers were
recruited from college campuses and the rank and file.
By 1999, it appeared that these efforts and initiatives were paying off
when the media reported a net gain of 265,000 in union membership-
the first such gain in more than twenty years (AFL-CIO 2000). But this would
not last. Even leaving aside the tragic and unusual events of September
11, 2001, it is clear that despite all the new initiatives and resources being
devoted to organizing and all the talk of "changing to organize;' American
unions have been standing still at best. The major victories have been
highly concentrated in a few unions (SEIU, HERE, UNITE, CWA, AFSCME,
and UAW) and industries (healthcare, building services, hotels, airlines,
telecommunications, and higher education), while the majority of unions
continue to experience organizing losses and declining membership (BNA
PLUS 2001).
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In this chapter we seek to answer the following questions: Why has it been
so difficult for unions to turn the organizing efforts and initiatives of the last
six years into any significant gains in union density? Why have a small number
of unions been able to make major gains through organizing? And most
importantly, which organizing strategies will be most effective in reversing the
tide of the labor movement's organizing decline?
What our findings will show is that while the political, legal, and economic
climate for organizing continues to deteriorate, and private sector employers
continue to mount aggressive opposition to organizing efforts, some unions
are winning. Our findings also show that the unions that are most successful
at organizing run fundamentally different campaigns, in both quality and
intensity, than those that are less successful, and that those differences hold
true across a wide range of organizing environments, company characteris-
tics, bargaining unit demographics, and employer campaign variables.
PREVIOUS ORGANIZING RESEARCH
Industrial relations research has provided important insights regarding the
influence of environmental factors, company characteristics, and employer
behavior on the outcome of NLRB certification elections (Farber and Western
2001; Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1994; Freeman and Kleiner 1988; Maranto
and Fiorito 1987; Rose and Chaison 1990). This research has also deepened
our understanding of the factors shaping attitudes toward unions and
the individual union voter decision making process Oarley and Fiorito
1991; Freeman and Rogers 1999; Weikle, Wheeler and McClendon 1998).
Another stream of research has focused on the impact that institutional
characteristics of unions have on organizing success (Fiorito, Jarley and
Delaney 1995; Hurd and Bunge 2002). Yet,with the exception of a handful of
studies, most quantitative organizing research has failed to capture the criti-
cal role played by union strategies in organizing campaigns (Bronfenbrenner
1997a; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; and Peterson, Lee, and Finnegan
1992).
A small but growing body of qualitative case study research does explore
the role of union strategies in the organizing process, exposing the interac-
tions between environmental factors, employer behavior, and union strategies
(Hoerr 1997; Waldinger and Erickson et al. 1998; Sciacchitano 1998; Juravich
and Hilgert 1999; Delp and Quan 2002). By capturing the dynamic role of
union strategies, this research also provides much needed insight into how the
organizing process actually develops. However, this literature suffers from the
limitations of case study designs that can capture only a small number of
organizing campaigns, representing the most dramatic or interesting cases
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(and almost all victories), and as such, are often unrepresentative of union
organizing behavior.
Bronfenbrenner's survey of 261 private-sector NLRB certification elections
in 1986 and 1987 was the first detailed study of the role of union tactics in
organizing and first contract campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 1993; 1997a). The
study showed that unions were more likely to win NLRB elections if they
used rank-and-file intensive tactics such as person-to-person contact, active
representative committees, member volunteer organizers, solidarity days, and
building for the first contract before the election. This research also found that
union tactics as a group had a more significant impact on election outcomes
than other groups of variables that have been the traditional focus of indus-
trial relations research, such as election environment, bargaining unit demo-
graphics, and employer characteristics (1993; 1997a). This was an important
finding, because some researchers (such as William Dickens 1983) had argued
that union tactics were entirely reactive-determined solely by management
tactics. Subsequent quantitative studies of both private-sector NLRB elections
and public-sector organizing campaigns have reinforced Bronfenbrenner's
earlier research (Bronfenbrenner 1997c, 2000, and 2002; Bronfenbrenner and
Juravich 1998; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1998).
However, in the more than ten years since this research was initiated, a
great deal has changed in the economy, employer behavior, and the labor
movement itself. Workers in almost every industry face more sophisticated
employer opposition to organizing that is coupled with dramatic increases in
corporate restructuring, foreign trade and investment, and shifts in work and
production to other companies and other countries (Bronfenbrenner 2000,
2001). As Bronfenbrenner and Juravich found in their study of 1994 NLRB
campaigns, traditional organizing approaches and the isolated use of innova-
tive tactics have decreased in effectiveness (1998). Although some individual
tactics, such as representative committees, workplace job actions, and media
campaigns have a statistically significant positive impact on election out-
comes, other tactics, such as house-calling the majority of the unit, holding
solidarity days, staging rallies, or running a community campaign, did not
have a significant impact. Yet, when these variables were combined into a
single union tactics variable, adding one unit for each additional tactic, the
probability of the union winning the election increased by as much as 9
percent for each additional tactic used. This suggests that the effectiveness of
union tactics is strategically significant when unions combine tactics in a more
comprehensive campaign.
In the years following the 1994 study, research by Bronfenbrenner and
others has continued to show that comprehensive union tactics still hold the
key to successful organizing efforts. Unions that use a broad range of union
tactics as part of a multifaceted comprehensive strategy display greater organ-
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izing success across all
employer characteristics
Sherman and Voss2000).
Sherman and Voss (2000), in their study of local union organizing in
Northern California, argue that the implementation of innovative tactics, such
as rank-and-file intensive organizing and strategic targeting, requires far-
reaching organizational transformation. Without such organizational trans-
formation, unions may use some innovative tactics, but are unlikely to
integrate a comprehensive union-building strategy. Indeed, Sherman and Voss
found that the locals using a comprehensive union-building strategy are also
the most innovative organizationally. This challenge to transform organiza-
tionally in order to fully implement innovative tactics suggests one reason
why the dispersion of comprehensive union-building strategies has been so
limited.
industries, bargaining unit demographics, and
and behaviors (Bronfenbrenner 1997c, 2002;
RESEARCH METHODS
The data analyzed in this chapter were collected as part of a larger study com-
missioned in May 2000 by the United States Trade Deficit Review Commis-
sion to update Bronfenbrenner's previous research on the impact of capital
mobility on union organizing and first contract campaigns in the U.S. private
sector (Bronfenbrenner 1997b, 2000). Using surveys, personal interviews, doc-
umentary evidence, and electronic databases, we compiled detailed data on
election background, organizing environment, bargaining unit demographics,
company characteristics and tactics, labor board charges and determinations,
union characteristics and tactics, and election and first contract outcomes for
412 NLRB certification election campaigns held in 1998 and 1999.
Our original random sample of 600 elections was derived from data com-
piled by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) of all NLRB single-union cer-
tification election campaigns in units with fifty or more eligible voters that
took place in 1998-1999 (BNA PLUS 2000).1 For each case in the sample we
conducted in-depth surveys of the lead organizer for the campaign by mail
and phone. We also searched computerized corporate, media, legal, and union
databases, and reviewed Security and Exchange Commission filings, IRS
990 forms, and NLRB documents to collect data on company ownership,
structure, operations, employment, financial condition, unionization, and
employer characteristics and practices.
We were able to complete surveys for 412 of the 600 cases in the sample,
for a response rate of 69 percent. Further, we were able to collect corporate
ownership, structure, and financial information for 99 percent of the 412
cases. NLRB data were compiled from the FAST database for 65 percent of the
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136 cases where NLRB charges were filed, while NLRB documents were col-
lected for 46 percent. Summary statistics for the sample reveal that it is rep-
resentative of the population of all NLRB certification elections in units over
fifty that took place in 1998-1999 in terms of both industry and outcomes
(BNA Plus 2000).
Descriptive statistics were calculated for a wide range of variables in order
to capture the nature and extent of union and employer organizing activity
and the broader context in which they operate. In addition, binary logistic
regression was used to determine whether the number of comprehensive
union-building strategies has a statistically significant impact on certification
election outcome when controlling for the influence of election background,
company characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and employer
opposition.
THEORETICAL MODELAND HYPOTHESES
This research builds on the theoretical model developed by Bronfenbrenner
(1993), and Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1997) in previous organizing
studies. According to this model, environmental factors plus union and
employer characteristics and strategies combine to affect the election outcome
both indirectly as they moderate the effect of other factors and directly as they
influence worker propensity to vote for the union.2 Under this model, union
organizing tactics are an extremely important element of the organizing
process. They play just as much-if not even a greater-role in determining
election outcome than environmental factors and company characteristics
and tactics.
This study tests two hypotheses. The first is that union success in certifica-
tion elections depends on a comprehensive union-building strategy that
incorporates the following ten elements, each of which is a cluster of key union
tactics, that we argue are critical to union organizing success in the current
environment: (1) adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources, (2)
strategic targeting, (3) active and representative rank-and-file organizing
committees, (4) active participation of member volunteer organizers, (5)
person-to-person contact inside and outside the workplace, (6) benchmarks
and assessments to monitor union support and set thresholds for moving
ahead with the campaign, (7) issues which resonate in the workplace and in
the community, (8) creative, escalating internal pressure tactics involving
members in the workplace, (9) creative, escalating external pressure tactics
involving members outside the workplace, locally, nationally, and/or
internationally, (10) building for the first contract during the organizing
campaign.3
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This model expands upon Bronfenbrenner and Juravich's 1998 study by
arguing that in the current organizing environment it is not enough to use as
many union tactics as possible; rather, certain strategic elements, each com-
prised of clusters of key tactics, are essential ingredients for union organizing
success. These strategic elements, which we will call comprehensive organiz-
ing tactics, may each be associated with higher win rates and/or have statisti-
cally significant positive effects on election outcomes. However, given the
hostile climate in which unions must operate, we hypothesize that the use of
these individual comprehensive organizing tactics will not be enough. Instead,
union gains will depend on a multifaceted campaign utilizing as many of the
ten comprehensive organizing tactics as possible. We hypothesize that the like-
lihood a union will win an election significantly increases for each additional
comprehensive organizing tactic used by the union.
Our second hypothesis is that differences in the quality and intensity of the
campaigns between unions are a better predictor of differences in election
outcomes for those unions than employer opposition, bargaining unit demo-
graphics, or company or industry characteristics. We do not suggest that
industry, corporate structure, unit type, worker demographics, or employer
opposition do not matter. As our previous research has shown, all of these
factors have a very powerful and significant impact on union win rates
(Bronfenbrenner 1997a, 1997c, 2001; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998).
Indeed, it is more difficult to organize mobile industries, such as metal pro-
duction and fabrication, garment and textile, food processing, and call centers,
in the current global trade and investment climate. It is also more difficult to
organize subsidiaries of large multinational corporations that have the
resources to launch a full-scale counterattack against the union campaign.
Furthermore, higher paid, primarily white male, blue collar, white collar, and
professional and technical occupations are more difficult to organize in the
current climate, because they tend to be more invested in the internal labor
markets and more affected by threats of job loss or blacklisting that are typical
in employer campaigns today (Bronfenbrenner 1997a; 2001). Although indus-
try, unit type, worker demographics, and employer characteristics and tactics
matter, union tactics matter more, because unions have so far to go before
they live up to their full potential. While the majority of unions today run
very weak campaigns with no underlying strategy, the majority of employers
run very strategic campaigns, taking full advantage of the range of effective
anti-union tactics available to them, and adapting and tailoring those tactics,
depending on the organizing environment and the union's campaign.
If all unions were running aggressive comprehensive campaigns, and win
rates continued to vary across the organizing environments in which indi-
vidual unions operate, then these differences in organizing environment
would play the primary role in explaining the variance in organizing success
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between unions. Instead, we hypothesize that the more successful unions owe
their organizing victories to the nature, quality, intensity, and comprehen-
siveness of their campaigns, across a diversity of industries, companies, bar-
gaining units, and employer campaigns. Similarly, unions with lower win rates
lose more elections because of the lack of intensity, quality, and comprehen-
siveness of the campaigns they run, rather than the organizing environment
in which they operate.
We first test the hypotheses by comparing means, frequencies, and win rates
for each of the comprehensive organizing tactics that make up our model,
both individually and as part of the additive comprehensive organizing tactics
variable. This will allow us to see whether, in accordance with our first hypoth-
esis, win rates improve as the number of comprehensive organizing tactics
increases. We will also test different combinations of comprehensive organiz-
ing tactics in order to ensure that all of the elements of our model contribute
to union organizing success when added together with the other elements of
the model. Next, we will compare means, frequencies, and win rates for
company characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and employer behav-
ior in campaigns where unions used a comprehensive union-building strat-
egy, including more than five of the comprehensive organizing tactics listed
above, as compared to campaigns where unions used five or fewer compre-
hensive organizing tactics.4 This will allow us to see both the nature of the
environment in which unions are organizing today and whether, in accor-
dance with our second hypothesis, union win rates increase across different
industry, company, unit, and employer characteristics when the union runs
more comprehensive campaigns.
We then will use binary logistic regression to test the hypothesis that the
odds of winning the election will significantly increase for each additional
comprehensive organizing tactic used, when we control for election back-
ground, employer characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and
employer tactics. We will also standardize the logistic regression coefficient in
order to further test the relative effects of each of the statistically significant
variables. We will use two models. Model A will include each of the individ-
ual elements of the comprehensive strategy, while model B will substitute a
number of union tactics adding one point for each additional comprehensive
tactic used. As described in appendix 1.2, the following control variables (with
their predicted impact) will be included in both models: number of eligible
voters (+/_);5 manufacturing sector (-); subsidiary of a larger parent company
(-); ownership change before the election (+);6good to excellent financial con-
dition (+);7 board determined unit (-); other organized units (+); profes-
sional, technical, or white collar unit (-); unit at least 60 percent women (+);
unit at least 60 percent workers of color (+);8and number of employer tactics
used (-).
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We will further test the second hypothesis by examining frequencies,
means, and win rates across unions. This will allow us to evaluate the relative
intensity and quality of union campaigns for each union and assess which
unions are most likely to use each of the comprehensive organizing tactics in
our model. It will also allow us to compare win rates across unions, depend-
ing on the number of comprehensive organizing tactics used, to see whether
differences in union win rates are associated with the number of comprehen-
sive organizing tactics they use.
ELEMENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE UNION-BUILDING STRATEGY
According to our hypotheses, each of the ten tactical clusters, or comprehen-
sive organizing tactics in our model enhances the union's organizing power
in a unique way. Unions that allocate adequate and appropriate staff and
financial resources,9 for example, make an institutional commitment to be
more intensely engaged in the campaign, recruit staff who are demographi-
cally representative of the workers they organize, and run more campaigns.
Unions that engage in strategic targeting have approached organizing as a
means to build bargaining power within certain sectors and industries, in con-
trast to the non-strategic "hot shop" organizing approach. Perhaps the single
most important component of a comprehensive campaign is an active repre-
sentative committee that gives bargaining unit members ownership of the
campaign and allows the workers to start acting like a union inside the work-
place, building trust and confidence among the workforce and counteracting
the most negative aspects of the employer campaign.
The use of member volunteers to assist in organizing campaigns reflects a
combination of greater institutional integration of current and potential new
members and an emphasis on a worker-to-worker approach to organizing.
Person-to-person contacts made inside and outside the workplace enhance
the union's organizing power by providing the intensive one-on-one contacts
necessary to build and sustain worker commitment to unionization both at
home and in the increasingly hostile election environment at work. The com-
bination of benchmarks and assessments allows unions to evaluate worker
support for the union at different stages of the campaign in order to better
adjust their strategy to the unit they are trying to organize and to set thresh-
olds to determine when, and whether, they are ready to move on to the next
stage of the campaign.
A focus on issues that resonate with the workers and the community, such
as respect, dignity, fairness, service quality, and union power and voice, is
essential both to build worker commitment to withstand the employer
campaign and to gain community support. Internal pressure tactics allow the
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union to start acting like a union before the election takes place, building sol-
idarity and commitment among the workers being organized and restraining
employer opposition. External pressure tactics, which exert leverage on the
employer both in the local community and in their national or international
operations, are essential to organizing in the increasingly global corporate
environment. Finally, building for the first contract before the election helps
build confidence in the workers being organized, showing them what the
union is all about and signaling to the employer that the union is there for
the long haul.
RESULTS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics on the election background and
outcome for the 412 elections in our sample. In an improvement over past
years, these data suggest that today's unions are beginning to target and win
in slightly larger units. With an election win rate of 44 percent, first contract
rate of 66 percent, and average unit size of 192 eligible voters, the percentage
of eligible voters who gain coverage under a contract has increased to 37
percent, compared to less than 25 percent in the early 1990s (Bronfenbrenner
2001,2002).
Still, this progress must be put in perspective. At a time when union density
in the private sector has dropped below 10 percent and total private sector
employment continues to increase by an average of 2.1 million workers each
year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002), a 9 percent increase in the unit size of
elections won is simply not enough. If unions are going to reverse the tide of
union density decline, they will need to target units of 5,000, or 10,000 or
more; significantly increase the number of organizing campaigns; and dra-
matically increase the percentage of eligible voters who gain coverage under
a union contract.
The overall drop between the percentage of the unit who signed cards
before the petition was filed and the percentage of the unit who actually ended
up voting for the unit remains quite high (17 percentage points). However, in
winning units, where the percentage of card signers averages as high as 71
percent, the percent union vote is only five percentage points lower (66
percent).10
COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIZING TACTICS
Table 1.1 also lists the frequencies and win rates associated with the ten com-
prehensive organizing tactics included in our strategic model. As predicted,
